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INTRODUCTION

Tort liability reforms headed the agenda of many state legislatures
in 1986.' A federal government task force entered the fray of controversy, recommending sweeping changes to existing tort law.2 Lobby
gToups from professional organizations, trade associations, and consumer groups pointed accusing fingers at each other, charging respon-

1. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1986, at Al, col. 3; Church, Sorry, Your Policy Is Cancelled,
TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16, 17.
2.

See REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFOR-

DABILITY (Feb. 1986) [hereinafter TORT WORKING GROUP REPORT]. The Tort Policy Working
Group was established by the United States Attorney General in October 1985. Id. at 1.
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sibility for the liability crisis.3 Commentators blamed the insurance
industry for creating the predicament. 4 The insurance industry countered by claiming greedy lawyers, an overly litigious society, and a
"crisis" in the courts accounted for high insurance premiums and lack
of insurance availability. 5 Despite these accusations, there are no easy
answers to the problem. Society depends on the availability of insurance to operate efficiently.6 Many individuals and businesses would be
unwilling to assume the risks of their endeavors without insurance to
protect them from the risk of financial destruction." Insurance has
become an integral part of our society, allowing citizens to function
freely without fear of accidental and debilitating losses. s
All fifty states have considered measures to ameliorate the liability
crisis. 9 Florida organized a task force in 1985 to study the problem. 10
The task force found that a liability insurance availability and affordability crisis existed and recommended changes in the area of medical
malpractice to curb the growing problem. 1 In 1986, the Florida Legislature responded with broad changes in the Florida tort system. 2 The
Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986 (Tort Reform Act) imposed
several changes to the tort system in hopes of stemming the tide of
the liability crisis.13 The legislature found that the current tort system
contributed significantly to the quandary.14 According to the legislature, immediate action was necessary to improve this compelling social
15
problem.
One of Florida's most controversial changes limited noneconomic
damages in tort actions.16 This note reviews the nature of similar

3. See Church, supra note 1.
4. See id.; Londrigan, The Medical Malpractice "Crisis," TRIAL, May 1985, at 25-27;
Nichols, The Manufacturing of a Crisis, THE NATION, Feb. 15, 1986, at 173-74; Peck, The
Great Insurance Scam, THE PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 1986, at 19.
5. See Church, supra note 1; Harris, Crisis in the Courts, INS. REV., Apr. 1986, at 52-57;
INS. INFORMATION INST., THE LAWSUIT CRISIS 2-3 (Apr. 1986).
6. D. BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL INSURANCE 84-91 (11th ed. 1983).
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. Church, supra note 1.
10. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: TOWARD PREVENTION AND EARLY RESOLUTION (Apr. 1985).
11. See id.
12. See Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 160.
13. Id. § 2.
14. Id. (preamble).
15. Id.
16. FLA. STAT. § 768.80 (Supp. 1986) ("damages for noneconomic losses to compensate for
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limitations as they apply to automobile No-Fault laws and the Florida
Workers' Compensation system. The constitutionality of damage limitations will be analyzed under the Florida Constitution and the United
States Constitution. Finally, this note examines the competing interests involved and concludes that such limitations should be constitutional if a reasonable probability exists that the legislation will curb
17
the liability crisis.

II.

OVERVIEW OF DAMAGE LIMITATIONS IN FLORIDA

The original Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act, better
known as the No-Fault Law, abolished an automobile owner's right
of action for property damage unless the damage exceeded $550.18 The
Florida Supreme Court declared this provision violative of the Florida
Constitution in Kluger v. White. 19 Article I, section 21 of the Florida
Constitution states: "[tihe courts shall be open to every person for
redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale,
denial or delay." 20 The court maintained that where a right of access
to courts was part of the state's common law, the legislature could
not abolish the right without providing a reasonable alternative to the
injured party.2 1 The legislature could abolish the right, however, if an
overpowering public necessity required such action and no alternative
would suffice.22
The court distinguished the No-Fault Law from an earlier statute,
held constitutional, which eliminated the right to sue for damages for
alienation of affection, criminal conversation, seduction, or breach of

pain and suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of
capacity for enjoyment of life, and other nonpecunary damages... may not exceed $450,000").
This note will refer to noneconomic damage limitation as it applies to tort actions. However,
unless otherwise specifically provided, the limitation applies to any action for damages in tort
or contract. Id. § 768.71(1).
17. Recently, the Florida Supreme Court held that Florida's noneconomic damage limitation
of $450,000 violated article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution dealing with the right of
access to the courts. Smith v. Department of Ins., 12 Fla. L.W. 189 (Fla. Apr. 24, 1987) (per
curiam). This note questions the reasoning of the court in that opinion, see infra notes 73-100
and accompanying text.
18. FLA. STAT. § 627.738 (1973).
19. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
20. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21. Although equal protection and due process arguments under
FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2 & 9 apply to tort damage limitations, this note will address only the
right of access to courts provision of the Florida Constitution. See infra § IV for a discussion
of equal protection and due process challenges under the United States Constitution.
21. 281 So. 2d at 4.
22. Id.
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promise.? Even though such causes of action were a part of the common law, the legislature had the power to abolish the rights of action
when they became instruments of extortion and blackmail.24 In other
words, because the rights were abused, the legislature could limit or
abolish the causes of action. The court found no such public necessity
in Kluger.2 The court noted that if the legislature required automobile
owners to purchase insurance against property damage, a reasonable
alternative to tort action would have been provided. 26 The No-Fault
Law, however, did not require insurance against property damage. 27
Had insurance been required, the issue would have been whether the
insurance requirement was reasonable.?
One year after Kluger was decided, the Florida Supreme Court
considered the validity of No-Fault Law provisions9 that abolished a
plaintiffs right to sue for noneconomic damages unless medical expenses exceeded $1,000 or unless the plaintiff incurred a specific type
of injury.30 In Lasky v. State FarmInsurance Co.,31 the court upheld
the statutory exemption from liability for intangible damages. The
court stated the exemption applied only to a limited class of cases. :-.2
Since the statute also required that automobile owners purchase insurance for personal injuries, the statute provided a reasonable alternative
to a tort action.? Insured persons received the right to speedy payment
of all medical bills and compensation for most lost income from their
own insurers.3
The Lasky court also considered the legislative purpose behind the
statutory exemption.? The legislative objectives included reducing
court congestion, lowering automobile insurance premiums, and correcting inequitable recoveries where minor claims were overpaid and
major claims were underpaid. The court found that these objectives

23.

Id.

24. Id.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. FLA. STAT. § 627.737 (1973).
30. See Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974); FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2)
(1973).
31. 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
32. Id. at 14, 18. The exemption applied to victims with medical expenses less than $1,000
unless they incurred a specific type of injury. Id.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 13-14; see also FLA.
Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 14.
Id. at 16.

STAT.

§ 627.733 (1973).
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bore a reasonable relationship to the liability exemption.36 The court
noted, however, that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it
presumed the validity of the legislative objectivesA 7
After Lasky, the Florida Legislature amended the No-Fault Law
and allowed an injured person to collect only a percentage of medical
expenses and lost wages.s The amendments were challenged in Chap,man v. Dillon39 The Florida Supreme Court held the amendments
constitutional.40 While claiming its decision comported with Lasky, 41
the court found that nothing in Lasky indicated a motorist must be
insured for the full amount of lost income and medical expenses.4 Lasky
only required that automobile owners obtain insurance to provide re43
covery for major and salient economic losses.
In his partial dissent, Justice Sunberg concluded that a statute
eliminating all causes of action for intangible damages for nonpermanent injuries was unconstitutional.4 He maintained that without a viable alternative, 4 5 the total bar from recovery of intangible damages was
unconstitutional. Under Justice Sunberg's analysis, a limit on the recovery of intangible damages may be valid where the right of recovery is
not completely abolished. According to his rationale, however, nothing
indicates whether a reasonable alternative must exist when intangible
damages are capped rather than eliminated.
The Florida Supreme Court reviewed damage limitations imposed
by the Florida Workers' Compensation Law in Acton v. Fort Lauderdale Hospital 6 The plaintiff challenged the Workers' Compensation
Law, claiming the statutory benefits deprived him of access to the
courts under the Florida Constitution. 47 The court stated that the workers' compensation scheme remained a reasonable alternative to tort

:36. Id. at 16-17.
37. Id. at 17.
38. The Florida Insurance and Tort Reform Act of 1977, ch. 77-468, 1977 Fla. Laws 468,
§ 33 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (1977)) (benefits for medical expenses
reduced from 100% reimbursement to 80%; reimbursement for lost income reduced either from
100% to 80%, or from 80% to 60%, depending on income tax treatment).
39. 415 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1982).
40. Id. at 19. The court found that the no-fault law did not violate the right of access to
courts, due process, or equal protection. Id.
41. Id. at 16-17.
42. Id. at 17.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 19.
45. Id.
46. 440 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1983); see also FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(a), (b) (1981).
47. Acton, 440 So. 2d at 1284.
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litigation.48 Although some workers may be personally disadvantaged

by the law, it afforded substantial benefits to many workers by removing the uncertainty and delay of a law suit.49 In a similar case, Mahoney
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., ° the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
district court's decision. The district court held that while the Workers'
Compensation Law may have significantly diminished the injured

worker's recovery, it had not totally eliminated a prior cause of action.51
A dollar cap on a worker's recovery was not, itself, a constitutional
violation. 52
These Florida cases involving statutory elimination of causes of action or damage limitations indicated the Florida Supreme Court's willingness to allow such legislation where a reasonable alternative to the
limitation was provided. This quid pro quo to common law action has
taken the form of compulsory insurance and general societal benefits
under No-Fault and Workers' Compensation laws.0 These laws were
enacted, in part, due to the unavailability and unaffordability of liability
insurance. The court indicated that a sufficient benefit conferred upon
society may be a reasonable quid pro quo for a limitation of damages.
Even a complete bar of intangible damages would not offend the Florida
Constitution where injured parties were assured recovery for major
and salient economic losses. 5
A recent decision of the Florida Supreme Court, however, leaves
these earlier opinons in doubt. In Smith v. Department of Insurance,r
the court held that Florida's cap on noneconomic damages in the Tort
Reform Act violated article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution.
In a per curiam opinion, the court found Kluger dispositive.57 In order
to place a cap on noneconomic damages, the legislature must provide

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 440 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 1983), affg 419 So. 2d 754 (1st D.C.A. 1982).
51. Mahoney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 419 So. 2d 754, 755-56 (1st D.C.A. 1982), affd, 440
So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 1983); see also FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(a) 1 (Supp. 1980).
52. Mahoney, 419 So. 2d at 755.
53. See id.; see also, e.g., Acton, 440 So. 2d at 1284 (worker's compensation); Chapman,
415 So. 2d at 17-18 (no-fault law); Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 14 (no-fault law).
54. See, e.g., 296 So. 2d at 16 (legislative objectives included "reduction of automobile
insurance premiums").
55. See Chapman, 415 So. 2d at 17; Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 14. The No-Faut statute addressed
in Chapman and Lasky completely abolished the right to sue for noneconomic damages unless
one of the statutory tort thresholds was met. See FLA. STAT. § 627.737 (1981), construed in
Chapman,415 So. 2d at 15; FLA. STAT. § 627.737 (1973), construedin Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 13-15.
56. 12 Fla. L.W. 189 (Fla. Apr. 24, 1987) (per curiam).
57. Id. at 191.
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a reasonable alternative unless an overpowering public necessity is
shown and no alternative method of meeting the public necessity
exists.5 The court determined that article I, section 21 drew no distinction between the right to sue for economic and noneconomic damages 9
Furthermore, no distinction existed between a legislative attempt to
cap noneconomic damages and an attempt to set a floor on the right
to sue for noneconomic damages as in Kluger.6° Accordingly, the court
found the legislature failed to provide a reasonable alternative to the
right to sue for noneconomic damages.6 1 Additionally, the court noted
that the trial court did not rely upon, nor did the appellees urge, that
the cap was based on a legislative showing of an overpowering public
necessity and the existence of no alternative method of meeting the
public necessity. 2
The Smith court distinguished Lasky and Chapman because the
No-Fault compensation scheme involved in those cases conferred an
alternative remedy and commensurate benefit upon the plaintiffs.6
First, the No-Fault statute required all motor vehicle owners to obtain
insurance or other security to protect injured victims with minimum
benefits.0 Second, the No-Fault statute provided a reasonable trade
off between the right to sue and the right not to sue since each motor
vehicle owner had an equal likelihood of being a tortfeasor or a victim
of an automobile accident. 65 By contrast, the cap on noneconomic damages only benefited the defendant in tort actions.Y Therefore, the cap
on noneconomic damages violated the constitutional right of access to
the courts.6 7
58.
59.

Id. at 191 (citing Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4).
Smith, 12 Fla. L.W. at 191.

60. Id.
61. Id. at 192.
62. Id. at 192. The court also noted that the appellees did not urge this rationale upon the
court.
63. Id. at 191. The alternative remedy and commensurate benefit to full tort recovery under
the No-Fault statute included: (1) assured recovery of major and salient economic losses; (2) a
lessening of congestion in the court system; (3) a reduction in court delays; (4) a reduction of
automobile insurance premiums; and (5) a reduction in the inequalities of recovery in the traditional tort system. Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 14, 16. The Smith court did not discuss the benefits
of increased availability and affordability of insurance that would assure recovery of all economic
and most noneconomic damages, or a reduction in the inequality of noneconomic damages awards
that a noneconomic damage limitation would purportedly confer.
64. Smith, 12 Fla. L.W. at 191.
65. Id.
66. Id. Even the Tort Reform Act's limitation on noneconomic recovery could run in both
directions, however, if the Smith court viewed the right to recover only $450,000 in noneconomic
damages and the right not to be sued for more than $450,000 in noneconomic damages on an
ex ante basis as it viewed the No-Fault legislation.
67. Id. at 195.
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ANALYSIS OF DAMAGE LIMITATIONS IN THE TORT REFORM
ACT UNDER THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION

The Florida Tort Reform Act places a $450,000 limit on
noneconomic losses to compensate for pain and suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary damages.6 While
no alternative remedy is given in the traditional sense, the legislation
may be justified by the benefit it confers on society. If the increase
in liability insurance premiums and the withdrawal of insurance carriers from high risk coverages result in uninsured claims and leave
victims without an adequate remedy, a cap on damages alleviating
the problem may be justified. Furthermore, legislation that promotes
the affordability and availability of insurance may significantly benefit
society. Otherwise, providers of essential goods and services might
curtail their activities because of an unwillingness to personally assume
enormous liability risks.69
The problem with prior Florida cases determining the constitutionality of damage limitations is that the Florida Supreme Court presumes
that the circumstances underlying the legislation are valid . 7 Thus, the
court defers to the legislative determination of whether a crisis exists.7 '

68. FLA. STAT. § 768.80 (Supp. 1986).
69. For a discussion of the need for insurance protection to encourage risk taking and
ensure economic stability, see D. BICKELHAUPT, supra note 6, at 3-91; Bacas, Liability: Trying
Times, NATION'S BUS., Feb. 1986, at 22 (insurance costs limiting product availability and
increasing costs); Church, supra note 1 (liability insurance will become crippling cost); Harris,
supra note 5 (wide range of businesses affected by liability litigation); Szabo, No Relief from
the Liability Crisis, NATION'S BUS., Oct. 1986, at 69-70; see also Tort Reform and Insurance
Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 160 (rationale for legislation); Note, The Constitutionality
of Recent Efforts to Limit PersonalInjury Damages Following the 1984-85 MICRA Decisions,
13 W. ST. U.L. REV. 595, 595-96 (1986) (companies abandoning lines of business due to high
liability insurance premiums, reduced coverage, and sometimes an absence of insurance; e.g.,
Cessna Aircraft Company ceased production of five types of small planes because product liability
insurance accounted for up to 30% of the planes' cost).
70. See Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 17. But cf. Smith, 12 Fla. L.W. at 192 (the court never
reached the issues of whether the circumstances underlying the noneconomic damage cap were
valid or whether the means chosen to solve the problem were rational because no alternative
remedy for the right to sue for noneconomic damages was provided nor was it urged upon the
court that an overpowering public necessity existed and no alternative method of meeting the
necessity would suffice).
71. See Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 17.
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Assuming the circumstances giving rise to the legislation are valid,
the court then determines whether the legislation is reasonably related
to a permissible legislative objective.72 The Smith court, however,
stated that the Kluger requirement of an alternative remedy or a
showing of an overpowering public necessity with no alternative
method of meeting the necessity is a prerequisite to a determination
of legislative rationality in enacting a noneconomic damage limitation.7
Thus, since this prerequisite was not shown to exist, the court made
no determination of whether the legislation was reasonably related to
a permissible legislative goal. 74 The Smith court apparently ignored
the findings of the Florida legislature that an insurance crisis existed
creating an overpowering public necessity for tort reform.
The Florida Legislature declared that a financial crisis existed in
the insurance industry. The underlying causes of the crisis created a
serious lack of availability of liability insurance. 75 The legislature found
that dramatic premium increases and the unavailability of insurance
seriously affected Florida's economy. 76 As a result, many persons subject to civil actions would be unable to purchase liability insurance.
Consequently, injured persons would be unable to recover damages
if the crisis were not abated. The legislature found that one cause of
the crisis was a tort system that allowed noneconomic damages that
have no monetary value except on a purely arbitrary basis. Specifically, the legislature wanted to provide a rational basis for determining
noneconomic losses. The interests of the injured party, however,
should be balanced against the interests of society as a whole. Since
all persons bear the ultimate burden of compensating victims for
noneconomic damages, the legislature was justified in attempting to
ameliorate the faults in the existing system.7 The legislature declared

72.
73.

See id.
Smith, 12 Fla. L.W. at 192.

74.

Id.

75. Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 160 (preamble).
76. See Smith, 12 Fla. L.W. at 190-91. The legislature responded to claims that businesses
were closing, physicians were severely limiting their practices, and public entities were reducing
public services. Virtually every kind of business experienced enormous increases in the cost of
doing business. For example, some companies faced approximately 500% premium increases and
were unable to purchase adequate insurance. Governmental agencies were forced to reduce
insurance coverage. Some governmental bodies faced premium increases from 490% to 1,700%.
Id. at 190-91 & n.4; see also Schulte, Availability, Affordability, and Accountability:Regulatory
Refoinz of Insurance, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 557, 558 (1986) (citing examples of companies
and governmental agencies facing insurance increases).
77. Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 160 (preamble).
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the insurance crisis had created an overpowering public necessity for
tort reform. 78
The insurance industry agreed with the legislature's assessment
of the financial woes faced by insurance companies. 79 The insurance
industry claimed that losses over the past years surpassed premium
and investment growth.8 s Other groups, however, charged that the
insurance industry created a crisis in order to raise premiums and
increase profits.,, It is beyond the scope of this note to determine the
cause of the liability crisis. Likewise, the Florida Supreme Court would
probably refrain from making such a determination. The court will
likely defer the determination to the legislature.m The court, however,
must decide whether the legislation reasonably promotes the objective
of alleviating the insurance crisis.m
In Smith, the cap on noneconomic damages violated the Florida
Constitution's right of access to the courts provision because the damage limitation failed to meet the Kluger exceptions.M The Smith court
distinguished cases upholding the No-Fault statutes because the NoFault scheme provided an alternative remedy and commensurate benefit., The court failed to recognize, however, that the No-Fault legislation provided no alternative remedy or commensurate benefit for
the right to sue for noneconomic damages. In Chapman and Lasky,
the right to sue for noneconomic damages was completely abolished
unless the tort thresholds were met. While the No-Fault Law provided an alternate remedy for the recovery of economic damages, no
similar benefit was provided for the recovery of noneconomic damages.
Lasky only required that the plaintiff receive recovery for major and
salient economic damages8 7

78.
79.

Id.

See, e.g., Church, supra note 1, at 17; Harris, supra note 5, at 52-57; INS. SERVS.

OFFICE, INC., INSURER PROFITABILITY -

THE FACTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE FINANCIAL

CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY

(Feb. 1986) at 3-16; Law-

makers OrderPremium Rollbacks; Modify Tort System, FLORIDA UNDERWRITER, July 1986,
at 16, 18.
80. See INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 79, at 9, 28.
81. See Church, supra note 1, at 17; Nichols, supra note 4, at 173-74; Peck, supra note 4,
at 19-20.
82. See Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 15-17.

83.

See id.

84. Smith, 12 Fla. L.W. at 191-92.
85. Id. at 191.
86. See FLA. STAT. § 627.737 (1981), construed in Chapman, 415 So. 2d at 15; FLA. STAT.
§ 627.737 (1973), construed in Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 13-15.
87. See Chapman, 415 So. 2d at 17; Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 14.
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Nevertheless, Smith held that the rights to sue for economic and
noneconomic damages stood on an equal constitutional footing.8 However, the No-Fault insurance statute only required motor vehicle owners to provide injured persons with minimum benefits for economic
damages.89 By contrast, the Tort Reform Act did not abolish the right
to sue for noneconomic damages, but only limited recovery to
$450,000.9 Therefore, the Smith decision casts doubt on the constitutionality of noneconomic damage limitations found in the No-Fault
Law. 91 Florida's Workers' Compensation system may also be unconstitutional under the Smith rationale since an injured worker has no
right to recover noneconomic damages from an employer covered by
the Workers' Compensation scheme.2 Apparently, the Florida Supreme Court has chartered a new constitutional course under the guise
of following earlier opinions. The attempt to distinguish the No-Fault
Law is unpersuasive if the right to sue for noneconomic damages is
an independent right on equal constitutional footing with the right to
sue for economic damages.
Courts construing the Tort Reform Act's noneconomic damage limitation should recognize the legislature's finding of an overpowering
public necessity. Courts should then determine whether the limitation
is rationally related to a permissible legislative objective. 93 Normally,
legislation carries a presumption of validity in the absence of evidence
to the contrary.Y As in the Workers' Compensation system, a dollar

88. Smith, 12 Fla. L.W. at 191.
89. See FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (1981) (providing payment of 80% of medical expenses,
80% of lost income if taxable under federal income tax laws or 60% of lost income if not so
taxed, and $1,000 funeral, burial, or cremation benefits), construed in Chapman, 415 So. 2d at
12; FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (1973) (providing payment of 100% of medical expenses, 100% of
lost income if taxable under federal income tax laws or 85% of lost income if not so taxed, and
$1,000 funeral burial, or cremation benefits), construed in Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 14.
90. FLA. STAT. § 768.80 (Supp. 1986).
91. If the right to sue for noneconomic damages stands on equal footing with the right to
sue for economic damages under article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution, the No-Fault
Law's abolishment of the right to sue for noneconomic damages violates the Florida Constitution
unless an alternative remedy or commensurate benefit is provided for the lost right to recover
noneconomic damages. Under the No-Fault Law, no such alternate remedy or commensurate
benefit is provided. See FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (1985).
92. See FLA. STAT. §§ 440.10-.11, .13, .15-.16 (1985). An employee has no right to sue an
employer complying with the Workers' Compensation Law for noneconomic damages. Id. §
440.11.
93. See Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 15-17.
94.

See id. at 17.
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cap on recovery is not, itself, a constitutional violation. 95 The question

remains whether the limitation of noneconomic damages in the Tort
Reform Act reasonably promotes the goal of abating the insurance
crisis.
Some insurance companies claim that a $450,000 cap on
noneconomic damages will not result in a premium reduction since few
noneconomic damage awards exceed that amount.9 Nevertheless, a
limitation on noneconomic damages may improve the defendant's settlement posture. 97 The threat of huge, unbridled noneconomic damage
awards forces defendants to settle at higher amounts than they otherwise would. 98 Additionally, the possibility of enormous jury awards
encourages plaintiffs to refuse otherwise reasonable settlement offers.9 In essence, the predictability of noneconomic damage awards
lacks the objective standards that exist in determining pecuniary losses. 10° For example, damages for lost wages are easier to determine
than damages for pain and suffering.
The practical effect damage caps will have on the insurance crisis,
therefore, is not readily determinable. If there is a reasonable likelihood that the limitation on noneconomic damages will provide some
relief, the Florida Supreme Court should uphold the legislation under
article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution. Since the right to sue
for economic damages remains and the cap on noneconomic damages
would apply to only a limited number of cases, the cap is not a complete
bar to recovery. Thus, the overall societal benefit may outweigh the
disadvantage incurred by a few.
IV.

DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS UNDER
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

Federal constitutional attacks on damage limitations imposed by
legislative bodies have centered around due process and equal protec95. Mahoney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 419 So. 2d at 754, 755 (Ist D.C.A. 1982), affd, 440
So. 2d at 1285 (Fla. 1983).
96. See Hunter & Angoff, Tort Reform Legislation. . . Ought to Reduce Premiums, Wall
St. J., Feb. 11, 1987, at 26, col. 3-4; J. Com. & Com., Oct. 21, 1986, at IA, col. 1; Letter and
exhibits from Thomas Rudd of Aetna Casualty and Surety Company to Charlie Gray of the
Florida Department of Insurance (Aug. 8, 1986) (indicating cap on noneconomic damages will
not affect liability insurance premiums according to actuarial data).
97.

See TORT WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 66-67 ("Plaintiffs frequently

have unrealistic expectations of non-economic damages in the hundreds of thousands or millions
of dollars to which defendants simply are unwilling to agree. Plaintiffs thus often reject settlement
offers that from the standpoint of compensation for economic damages are quite reasonable.").
98. See id.
99. Id. at 67.
100. As Professor Louis L. Jaffee stated: "To put a monetary value on the unpleasant

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss1/4

12

Gavin: The19S6
Constitutionality
Florida's
FLORIDA TORT of
REFORM
ACTCap on Noneconomic Damages in

tion challenges.1°1 Although this note treats the due process and equal
protection challenges separately, courts have not always delineated
the concepts succinctly. In many respects, the due process and equal
protection arguments are similar.102 Some overlap, therefore, is unavoidable.
A.
1.

Due Process

The Standard of Review -

A Historical Overview

The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-

hibits states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. 10 3 Although couched in procedural terms,
the due process clause also places substantive limitations on state
power to regulate economic and noneconomic life. 1°4 Initially, the
United States Supreme Court suggested that the due process clause
addressed only procedural unfairness. 105 However, even before the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, a "natural rights"

emotional characteristics of experience is to function without any intelligible guiding premise."
Jaffee, Damages for PersonalInjury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CONTEm'IP. PROB.
219, 222 (1953); see also TORT WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 66.
101. E.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (due
process challenge of liability limit on damages from nuclear accidents); Hoffman v. United States,
767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985) (equal protection challenge of California statute limiting liability
of noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions); Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,
39 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (due process and equal protection challenge
of California statute limiting noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985); Chapman v. Dillon, 415 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1982) (due process and equal
protection challenge of automobile no-fault statutes); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho
859, 555 P. 2d 399 (1976) (due process and equal protection challenge of limit on recovery in
medical malpractice actions); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585
(1980) (due process and equal protection challenge to limit on medical malpractice recovery);
Arneson v. Oeson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) (due process and equal protection challenge to
statute limiting recovery in medical malpractice cases).
102. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 93 (1978); Jones
v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 866, 555 P.2d 399, 406 (1976).
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
104. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The Court sustained, against a due process attack, a federal prohibition on the interstate shipment of certain
types of milk. In Justice Stone's famous footnote 4, however, he stated, "[T]here may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears
on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution . . . ." Id.
105. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). In dissent, Justice Bradley
asserted that state legislation giving a particular company a monopoly over slaughter houses
violated the due process rights of butchers not included in the monopoly. Id. at 122 (Bradley,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

13

Florida Law
Review, LAW
Vol. 39,
Iss. 1
REVIEW
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA

[1987], Art. 4

[Vol. 39

theory emerged among many English and American philosophers. 1'
The natural rights doctrine held that certain rights were fundamental
or natural and could not be restricted without due process of law.

Although this doctrine surfaced in court opinions,107 most early opinions
reviewing the due process clause avoided interfering with legislative
policy. 108
The door to future limitations on state regulations through the due
process clause was opened in 1887. In Mugler v. Kansas 0 9 the United
States Supreme Court sustained a state ban on alcoholic beverages,
but indicated there were some limits on a state legislature's actions.1" °
A state statute must have a substantial relation to legislative objectives without invading rights secured by "fundamental law."' Finally,
in 1897, the Court invalidated a state statute on substantive due process grounds in Allgeyer v. Louisiana.112The Court stated the guarantee on liberty in the fourteenth amendment protected both physical
and intangible liberties, such as the right to live and work where one

wishes and the freedom to enter into lawful contracts." 3 After
Allgeyer, the Court frequently substituted its judgment for the legislature's in the area of economic regulation.14
A philosophical shift towards greater deference to legislative intervention occurred during the New Deal era.15 In Nebbia v. New York,"r
the Court held that the due process guarantee dictated that "the law

J., dissenting). The majority rejected this view, apparently reasoning that due process protects
only against procedural unfairness. See id. at 36.
106. See E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 10-57 (1948); Corwin, The "Higher
Law" Baekground of American ConstitutionalLaw, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928-1929).
107. Some courts echoed the natural rights theory. Consider Lord Coke's statement in
1610: "[Flor when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or
impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void
....
Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (1610). Consider also Justice Chase's statement
in 1798: "[a]n act of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles
of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority." Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
108. See Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
109. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
110. Id. at 661.
111. Id.
112. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
113. Id. at 589.
114. See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 439 (5th ed.
1980); see also B. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154 (1942)
(ascendance of substantive due process reasoning).
115. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 449 (1978).
116. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought
to be attained.' 1 17 The Nebbia Court upheld a state regulatory price-fixing scheme for the milk industry. " 8 It declared that through appropriate legislation, "a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare." 9 In subsequent
cases, the Supreme Court retreated from the requirement of a "real
and substantial relation" between economic regulation and a legitimate
120
state objective.
In Ferguson v. Skrupa,121 the Supreme Court virtually abandoned
any judicial scrutiny of economic legislation. 12 In upholding a state
statute prohibiting non-lawyers from engaging in the business of debt
adjusting, the Court stated it was "up to legislatures, not courts, to
decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation."' The Court was not
concerned with the "wisdom, need, or appropriateness" of the legislation. - , A state law would not run afoul of the due process clause if
it did not violate a specific constitutional prohibition or valid federal
law. 12
2.

The Modern Standards of Review

Today, courts generally review legislation using either the strict
scrutiny standard or the minimum rationality test. 126 Strict scrutiny

117. Id. at 525.
118. Id. at 539.
119. Id. at 537.
120. The rational basis test replaced the "real and substantial relation test" of Nebbia in
subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("[Ilt is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it"); Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel.
Western Ref. & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941) ("[w]e are not concerned, however, with
the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation .... There is no necessity for the state
to demonstrate before us that evils persist .

. . .");

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304

U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ("the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless.., it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators.").
121. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 729.
124. Id. at 730 (quoting Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Ref. & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S.
236, 246 (1941)).
125. Id. at 730-31 (quoting Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949)).
126. Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional
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requires that a state prove that it has a compelling interest to restrict

fundamental rights and that state action is necessary to promote that
interest.127 The strict scrutiny standard applies only to laws that substantially impinge upon fundamental rights.m These rights include

individual liberties

29 such

as the right to privacy, 130 and those guaran-

tees that are explicitly or implicitly grounded in the Constitution.1'
Laws depriving individuals of nonfundamental rights, such as
economic rights, are subjected to a mere rationality test.132 Application

of the rational basis test presumes the constitutionality of economic
regulation unless it is arbitrary or irrational. 13 The Supreme Court
rejected an intermediate level of scrutiny applied to purely economic
matters based on a due process challenge. 1' However, the Supreme
Court applied a heightened intermediate level scrutiny to cases involving gender and illegitimacy under an equal protection challenge, and
to cases involving other explicit constitutional guarantees.'r
In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,1363
the Supreme Court found that a statutory damage limitation was "a

"Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 143, 151

(1981).
127. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982); Learner, supra note 126, at 152; Note,
California'sMedical Injury CompensationReform Act: An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S.
CAL. L. REV. 829, 860 (1979); Note, The Constitutionality of Califorria Civil Code Section
3333.2, 7 W. ST. U.L. REV. 39, 44 (1979) [hereinafter The Constitutionalityof California Civil
Code].
128. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17, reh'g denied, 411
U.S. 959 (1973); Learner, supra note 126, at 152.
129. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (right to travel is fundamental).
130. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital privacy is fundamental
right).
131. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34, reh'g denied,
411 U.S. 959 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973); Learner, supyra note 126, at 152.
132. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 82-84 (1978);
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976); Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 30-32.
133. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83-84 (1978).
134. Id. Accord Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1435-36 (9th Cir. 1985) (federal
circuit court also rejected intermediate level scrutiny when reviewing noneconomic damage
limitation in medical malpractice cases). See generally Gunther, Forward:In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARv. L. REV. 1,
20-24 (1972) (examines intermediate level scrutiny). Under an intermediate level scrutiny, a
legislative measure must substantially further a purported legislative purpose. See, e.g., Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
135. E.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (illegitimacy); United States Trust Co.
v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (contract impairment); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(gender).
136. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
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classic example of an economic regulation - a legislative effort to
structure and accommodate 'the burdens and benefits of economic
life. ' ' 1' 37 The Court noted that generally, legislative acts are presumed
to be valid.' Furthermore, the one complaining of a due process
violation must establish that the legislature acted in an arbitrary and
irrational way. "9
In Duke Power, the Supreme Court upheld provisions of the PriceAnderson Act that placed a $560 million liability limitation on nuclear
accidents involving private nuclear power plants. 140 The Court deferred

4
to congressional judgment regarding the need for such legislation.1 1
The only inquiry was whether the limitation was arbitrary or irra-

tional.12 The Court acknowledged that while any limitation would be

arbitrary, the limitation imposed by the Price-Anderson Act was not
the kind of arbitrariness that invalidated otherwise constitutional action.143 Limiting liability was an acceptable method Congress could

use to encourage private investment and development of electrical
energy through atomic power.'4
Courts reviewing statutory damage limitations in medical malprac-

tice cases since Duke Power have used both the rational basis test
and the heightened, intermediate level of scrutiny.145 The North

137. Id. at 8,3.
138. Id. (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 64-65, 93-94.
141. Id. at 83-84.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 86. Although the Court found the limitation was not arbitrary, the Court failed
to articulate any exacting test for arbitrariness.
144. Id. at 89, 93-94.
145. See Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1985) (rational basis test
under equal protection review); Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 158, 695
P.2d 665, 679-80, 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 382-83 (rational basis test under due process and
equal protection analysis), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985); Jones v. State Bd. of
Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 866-67, 555 P.2d, 399, 406-07 (1976) (rational basis test applied to due
process review, but an intermediate test applied to equal protection review); Wright v. Central
Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ill. 1976) (somewhat harsh rational basis test under
state equal protection review); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 394400, 404
N.E.2d 585, 598-601 (1980) (rational basis test applied to due process and equal protection
analysis); Carson v. Mauer, 120 N.H. 925, 932-33, 424 A.2d 825, 830-31 (N.H. 1980) (intermediate
level scrutiny applied to state equal protection review, however, court noted that the United
States Supreme Court would apply rational basis test under the United States Constitution);
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978) (intermediate level scrutiny under equal
protection and due process review).
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1 46 determined that a
Dakota Supreme Court in Arneson v. OlSO
$300,000 statutory cap on health-care provider liability violated state
and federal constitutions. 147 Although the court invalidated the statutory cap on equal protection grounds, it indicated the proper due process review was an intermediate scrutiny. 14 The intermediate test
49
required a close relationship between the legislative means and goals.1
The North Dakota court found it appropriate to examine the legislative
purpose of the damage limitation.1 ° In the examination, evidence
showed the legislature was misinformed about the existence of a statewide insurance crisis.151
The Duke Power decision provided little guidance as to the proper
level of judicial review for the Arneson court. First, the possibility
of damages above the statutory cap in malpractice cases exceeded the
possibility of damages surpassing $560 million in a nuclear accident.5 2
Also, since Congress stated it would take additional action to protect
the public from a nuclear disaster if the need arose, the lack of a
corresponding commitment by the North Dakota legislature removed
Arneson from the guiding principles of Duke Power.'5
The Arneson intermediate level of review would probably not withstand a challenge before the United States Supreme Court on federal
constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court stated in Duke Power that
a statutory damage limitation was a classic example of economic regulation requiring only a rational basis level of scrutiny.'-' The Court's
reasoning regarding the remote possibility of a nuclear accident and
Congress' commitment to take further steps if necessary, established

146. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
147. Id. at 135-36.
148. Id. at 133. The court stated that the proper due process test was "whether the state
acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner." Id. This test is usually associated with a rational
basis standard of review. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 83-84. The Arneson Court indicated,
however, that this test approximated the intermediate level scrutiny in equal protection cases.
270 N.W.2d at 133.
149. 270 N.W.2d at 133.
150. Id. at 136.
151. Id. The state legislature based its determination of a malpractice insurance crisis on
national experience. The court found, however, that subsequent events had changed the situation.
Since North Dakota's experience with malpractice claims was lower than most states, at least
one insurance company had reduced North Dakota malpractice insurance rates below the national
average. Based on this information, the court determined that an insurance crisis did not exist. Id.
152. Id. at 135 n.6.
153. Id.
154. 438 U.S. at 83.
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only that Congress had not acted arbitrarily or irrationally. 155 The
Court did not imply that the absence of similar factors would remove
the legislation from rational basis review.
In Carson v. Mauer,156 the New Hampshire Supreme Court used
an intermediate level of scrutiny to invalidate a $250,000 limitation on
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions. 157 While recognizing that this heightened level of scrutiny applied only to cases involving
gender or illegitimacy classifications under the federal constitution,
the court nevertheless chose to provide greater protection under the
1 Therefore, the court decided the damage limitastate constitution.2
tion issue on state constitutional grounds. 159 The New Hampshire court

acknowledged its earlier decision to apply the rational basis test when
evaluating restrictions placed on an individual's right to recover in
tort. '0 The court concluded, however, that the rights involved in Carson were sufficiently important to warrant a more rigorous scrutiny
than allowed under the rational basis test. 161
Two recent decisions upholding a California statutory limitation of
$250,000 for noneconomic losses applied the rational basis test. 162 In
Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,16 the California Supreme Court
rejected an intermediate level scrutiny in reviewing statutory measures affecting economic rights.1 6 The court found that the cap on
noneconomic damages was rationally related to the legitimate state
interest of reducing insurance premiums for the medical profession. 16
The legislature determined that the rising cost of malpractice insurance
posed a serious problem to the health-care industry.166 The threat of
less available medical care and uninsured doctors, which would leave
injured patients with the prospect of uncollectible judgments, justified

the limitation on noneconomic damages.,- The court did not assess

155. Id. at 90-91, 93.

156. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
157. Id. at 932-33, 424 A.2d at 830-31.
158. Id. at 832, 424 A.2d at 831.

159. Id. at 943, 424 A.2d at 838.
160. Id. at 932, 424 A.2d at 830 (citing Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H.
661, 667, 406 A.2d 704, 707 (1979)).
161. Id. at 932, 424 A.2d at 830.
162. Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1985); Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 158, 163, 695 P.2d 665, 679-80, 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 382-83,
387, appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
163. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
164. Id. at 162 n.19, 695 P.2d at 682 n.19, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.19.
165. Id. at 159-60, 695 P.2d at 680-81, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383-85.
166. Id. at 158, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
167. Id., 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
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the justifications, wisdom, or fairness of the legislation;c rather, the
desirability of and the need for the measures taken were better left
19
to the legislature. 6
Similarly, the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
the rational basis test, rather than an intermediate level scrutiny, to
uphold the same California legislation. 170 In Hoffman v. United
States, 71 the court applied the rational basis test because the California
statute did not involve a suspect class, a fundamental right, or an
illegitimacy or gender classificationY72 In applying the rational basis
test, the court indicated that legislatures should be given substantial
latitude in making legislative judgments. 173
The Florida Supreme Court applied a rational basis test in examining automobile no-fault legislation and workers' compensaton laws.174
To determine whether the No-Fault Law violated due process, the
Lasky court considered whether the statute bore a reasonable relation
to a permissible legislative objective and whether the Act was discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppressive. 7 5 The court found it proper to
examine the legislature's objectives in enacting the statute.17 6 However, it did not concern itself with the wisdom of choosing the particular methods used or whether the means chosen would accomplish the
desired objectivesY7 The court held that threshold limitations for recovery of intangible damages were reasonably related to the proper
legislative goals of reducing congestion and delay in the courts and
decreasing automobile insurance premiums. 7 8 Likewise, the Chapman
court upheld the Florida No-Fault Law under a due process analysis.
The No-Fault Law was reasonably related to the permissible goal of
79
reducing insurance premiums.
The United States Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme Court
apply the rational basis level scrutiny when reviewing economic reg-

168. Id., 695 P.2d at 679, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
169. Id., 695 P.2d at 679, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (quoting American Bank & Trust Co. v.
Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 369, 683 P.2d 670, 676, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 677 (1984)).
170. Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1985).
171. 767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985).
172. Id. at 1436.
173. Id. (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
174. Acton, 440 So. 2d at 1284; Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 15.
175. 296 So. 2d at 15.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 15-16.
178. Id. at 16-17.
179. 415 So. 2d at 18.
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ulation.1so The Duke Power Court held that a statutory damage limitation was a classic example of economic legislation.,s, One challenging
such a provision must show that the legislature acted in an arbitrary
and irrational way. 1 2 The Florida Supreme Court similarly required
that economic legislation bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate
state interest.' Therefore, individuals challenging a statutory damage
limitation on due process grounds must show that the legislation arbitrarily and irrationally deprives them of a property right in compensa-

tion for injuries.
3.

Property Rights in Noneconomic Damages

A recurring dilemma in due process challenges to statutory damage
limitations is whether a person has a property right in a particular

measure of recovery. The United States Supreme Court refused to
directly answer this question in Duke Power.' Some courts hold that
a vested property right exists in the rules of common law.1 5 Other
courts question the validity of such a property right, but then proceed
to uphold or invalidate statutes limiting common law rights, presuming
the right exists. 86 Still other courts affirm a legislature's ability to
modify preexisting rights if the measure is not arbitrary or unreasonable.'"7 Commentators are also divided on whether common law rights
M

180. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 83-84; Chapman,415 So. 2d at 18; Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 15.
181. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 83.
182. Id. at 83-84.
183. Acton, 440 So. 2d at 1284; Chapman, 415 So. 2d at 18; Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 15.
184. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 87-88.
185. See Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, _, 355 N.E.2d 903,
910 (Com. P1. 1976). The court stated, "since medical malpractice or negligence actions were
known to the common law, previous to the Act in question, in the state of Ohio, it denies a
malpractice Plaintiff equal protection of the laws to impose a dollar limit on such actions." Id.
The court required that a quid pro quo be conferred on seriously injured malpractice victims
before damages could be limited. A societal quid pro quo would not suffice. Id. Cf. Wright v.
Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 327, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (1976). Although the
Wright court indicated that individuals had no complete vested right in common law remedies,
those remedies could not be abolished without a concomitant statutory remedy. Id., 347 N.E.2d
at 742 (citing Moushon v. National Garages, Inc., 9 Ill. 2d 407, 412, 137 N.E.2d 842, 845 (1956)).
A statutory remedy must accompany an abridgement of the vested right to common law remedies
extending directly to those affected. A societal quid pro quo was insufficient. Id. at 328, 347
N.E.2d at 742.
186. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 87-88; Mahoney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 419 So. 2d
754, 755-56 (1st D.C.A. 1982), affd, 440 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 1983); Learner, supra note 126, at
172-73.
187. See Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 158; 695 P.2d at 679, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382; Arneson, 270
N.W.2d at 134-35; see also Learner, supra note 126, at 172-73 (observing that some state courts
examine "whether a reasonably just substitute remedy" exists).
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to full compensation for tort injuries are constitutionally protected. 8
Early United States Supreme Court opinions seemed to conclude

that no property right in a particular common law rule or measure of
damages existed.ls 9 Recently, however, the Supreme Court suggested
the question may still be open for debate. In Duke Power, the Court
stated:
Initially, it is not at all clear that the Due Process Clause

in fact requires that a legislatively enacted compensation
scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide
a reasonable substitute remedy. However, we need not resolve
this question here since the Price-Anderson Act does, in our

view, provide a reasonably just substitute for the common-law
or state tort law remedies it replaces.19°

In his concurrence, however, Justice Stewart indicated that a state-

created right to recover full compensation for tort injuries was a right
protected under the due process clause.sI
While courts are reluctant to hold that the due process clause
guarantees any particular common law right, statutes that substantially abrogate those rights will be subject to closer inspection. 192 Attempting to avoid the question of vested property rights in common
law rules, many courts have focused on whether the legislative scheme

limiting common law rights provided a sufficient quid pro quo for the
rights so limited. 93 Under a due process analysis, these courts appear
to tacitly approve the validity of a vested right in common law rules.
Thus, due process challenges to statutes that limit recovery for tort

188. Compare Keith, The Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act - A
Survey and Analysis of Its History, Construction and Constitutionality,36 BAYLOR L. REV.
265, 329 (1984) ("[s]urely the right of injured persons to seek and receive redress for wrongs
done is an interest of sufficient substance that it may be protected from arbitrary and unconstitutional 'takings"') with Note, The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act: Legislative Surgery on
Patients' Rights, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 303, 320 ("abrogation of common law rights, through
legislation, is generally permissible").
189. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929) ("the Constitution does not forbid the creation
of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible
legislative object"); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877), quoted in Second Employers'
Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 50 (1912) ("[a] person has no property, no vested interest, in any
rule of the common law").
190. 438 U.S. at 88.
191. Id. at 94 (Stewart, J., concurring).
192. See, e.g., Carson, 120 N.H. at 932, 424 A.2d at 830 (the right to recover for personal
injuries is "sufficiently important to require that the restrictions imposed on those rights be
subjected to a more rigorous judicial scrutiny than allowed under the rational basis test").
193. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88-94; Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill.
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injuries are more likely to succeed when the legislation confers an
insufficient quid pro quo. 194
In Duke Power, the Supreme Court failed to articulate the requirement of a reasonably just substitute, or quid pro quo, to duplicate
the recovery of common law tort damages.195 Nevertheless, the Court
found that the Price-Anderson Act did provide a reasonable substitute
remedy to the limited recovery available to those injured by nuclear
accidents.196 The congressional assurance of a $560 million fund for
recovery and a commitment to take appropriate action to protect the
public from nuclear accidents established a fair and reasonable substitute for the uncertain damages a private concern might be required
to pay. 197 This reasonably just substitute was all the due process clause
required. 19s The Court noted prior Supreme Court decisions that fluctuated between no vested property right in common law rules and
the intimation of a quid pro quo requirement.9 The Duke Power Court
could have rejected the quid pro quo test altogether; its refusal to do
so suggests the vitality of at least a minimal quid pro quo showing
when legislation limits recovery in common law tort actions. Or, stated
more succinctly, the lack of a sufficient quid pro quo may show that
the legislature acted arbitrarily or irrationally.200
After Duke Power, several state supreme courts reviewed legislation that imposed damage caps in medical malpractice actions.201 Under
an independent due process analysis, these courts either rejected or
failed to require a quid pro quo.20 2 In Arneson, the North Dakota

2d 313, 328-30, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742-43 (1976); Carson, 120 N.H. at 943-44, 424 A.2d at 837-38;
Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 135-36; Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984).
194. See Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
195. See 438 U.S. at 88.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 90-91, 93.
198. Id. at 93.
199. Id. at 88 n.32.
200. See Learner, supra note 126, at 181-84, 200-01; Note, supra note 188, at 321.
201. See Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 137, 695 P.2d at 666, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 369 ($250,000 cap on
noneconomic damages); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 380, 404 N.E.2d 585,
590 (1980) ($500,000 limitation upon recovery); Carson, 120 N.H. at 930, 424 A.2d at 829
($250,000 limit on noneconomic damages); Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 129 ($300,000 limit on damages).
202. See Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 158, 161 n.18, 695 P.2d at 679, 681 n.18, 211 Cal. Rptr. at
382, 385 n.18 (no vested property right in a particular measure of damages; legislature can
modify scope and nature of such damages); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374,
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Supreme Court stated that "[w]e do not hold, or even suggest, that
no right may be limited or withdrawn without providing a quid pro
quo ....
However,... any limitation or elimination of a pre-existing
right may not be arbitrarily imposed. ' ' 203 The Indiana Supreme Court,

in Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc.,204 found that a statutory cap
on damages would increase the availability of insurance, thereby providing injured plaintiffs with a fund for recovery and preserving the
availability of health care services. 20 5 Though not requiring a reason-

ably just substitute, the Indiana court determined that the resulting
societal quid pro quo indicated the legislation was rationally related
to its intended goal.2°6 In Fein, the California Supreme Court stated
"the Legislature retains broad control over the measure, as well as
the timing, of damages ...... 207 Therefore, due process did not prohibit
the legislature from limiting recovery of noneconomic damages to promote the legitimate state interest of reducing medical malpractice
insurance rates. Such a limitation would ensure the availability of
medical care and reduce the likelihood of there being uninsured doctors.

208

Duke Power and the later state supreme court cases suggest that
no vested property right in a particular measure of damages exists
under the due process clause. However, limitations upon recovery in
tort actions without a reasonably just substitute might indicate an
arbitrary and irrational act of the legislature. The sufficiency of the
quid pro quo seems to be satisfied by a reasonable societal benefit.2

In Duke Power, the assurance of a $560 million fund to compensate
victims of a nuclear accident, and the congressional commitment of

396-97, 404 N.E.2d 585, 599-600 (1980) (no quid pro quo requirement; however, societal quid
pro quo of preserving availability of health care services made damage limitation nonarbitrary
and rational); Carson, 120 N.H. at 943, 424 A.2d at 837-38 (quoting Wright v. Central Du Page
Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 328, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (1976)) (quid pro quo must extend directly

to the seriously injured malpractice victim; societal quid pro quo not sufficient); Arnzeson, 270
N.W.2d at 134-35 (no quid pro quo requirement).
203. 270 N.W.2d at 134-35.
204. 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
205. Id. at 396-400, 404 N.E.2d 599-601.
206. Id. at 396, 400, 404 N.E.2d at 599, 601.
207. 38 Cal. 3d at 158, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383 (emphasis in original).
208. Id., 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
209. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 90-91. But see Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 136 (citing Wright
v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 328, 329, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742, 743 (1976))
(societal quid pro quo rejected; quid pro quo that does not extend to the seriously injured victim

is arbitrary).
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future action to protect the public, justified a limitation on liability. 210
In the medical malpractice cases, courts indicated that the limitations
on damages promoted the availability and affordability of malpractice
insurance, assured the public of adequate health services, and reduced
the likelihood of there being uninsured doctors. Courts found that
these benefits conferred a sufficient societal quid pro quo under the
due process clause.211 Thus, when a legislature acts to avoid a perceived
evil by limiting damages in tort actions, the statutory measure should
withstand a due process challenge if it provides a reasonable societal
quid pro quo and promotes a legitimate legislative interest.
4.

The Florida Tort Reform Act's Limitation on Noneconomic
Damages under a Due Process Review

The Florida Legislature passed a tort reform package to alleviate
perceived economic instability due to a serious insurance affordability
and availability problem.212 The Florida Tort Reform Act was enacted
to ensure the availability of liability insurance at reasonable rates and
to ensure that injured persons recover reasonable damages. 2 3 The
Tort Reform Act placed a $450,000 cap on noneconomic damages in
tort actions to help accomplish this goal.214 This limitation on damages
complies with the due process clause if it bears a rational relation to
a legitimate state interest.215 Although it is unclear whether an individual has a vested property right in noneconomic damages over
$450,000, the legislature should supply a sufficient quid pro quo to
justify the limitation. 216
Under the rational basis test, courts defer to legislative judgment
regarding the need for economic regulation.217 The Florida Legislature
determined that unless the liability insurance crisis abated, many persons subject to civil actions would be unprotected by insurance and
injured persons would be unable to collect damages. 28 Florida has a

210. 438 U.S. at 90-91.
211. See Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 159-60, 695 P.2d at 680-82, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383-85; Johnson,
273 Ind. at 396, 599. But cf. Carson, 120 N.H. at 943, 424 A.2d at 837-38 (societal quid pro
quo rejected on grounds of state equal protection rather than due process); Arneson, 270 N.W.2d
at 135-36 (societal quid pro quo rejected on grounds of equal protection rather than due process
although court considered due process).
212. Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 160 (preamble).
213. Id. § 2.
214. FLA. STAT. § 768.80 (Supp. 1986).
215. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 83-84; Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 15.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 184-200.
217. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 83-84; Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 15-17.
218. Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 160 (preamble).
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legitimate governmental interest in its economy and its citizens' welfare. Therefore, the legislature may remedy the perceived insurance
crisis by limiting damages if the limitation is not arbitrary or irrational.
Since tort law and liability insurance are interrelated, the legislature found that reforming the tort system was necessary to improve
the availability and affordability of insurance. 219 The damage limitation
applies solely to noneconomic damages because they have no monetary
value, except on a purely arbitrary basis.2 0 The legislature recognized
that noneconomic losses should be fairly compensated. 2 But, the interests of injured persons should be balanced against the interests of
society as a whole, because all persons ultimately bear the burden of
compensating for such losses.2
Noneconomic damages are as much a loss proximately caused by
the tortfeasor as are economic damages, and should be awarded.2
However, the inherent subjectivity of noneconomic damage awards
may justify a reasonable limitation of those awards. 2 2 The difficulty
lies in measuring a noneconomic experience in economic terms.22
Moreover, assessing the monetary value of an unpleasant emotional
experience requires functioning without any intelligible guiding premise . 26 Nevertheless, juries are asked to value noneconomic damages
without objective standards. Jury awards for similar injuries can vary
immensely and lead to highly inequitable, lottery-like results. 2 7
Noneconomic damage awards are "unimaginably subject to expansion
by skillful advocacy in front of juries. ' ' ?8 Because pain and suffering

219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Constitutionalityof CaliforniaCivil Code, supra note 127, at 54. An award of damages
for pain and suffering is justified by the value Americans place upon the pursuit of happiness.
If a tortfeasor's negligence restricts the victim's ability to fully pursue happiness, society's sense
of justice demands compensation for the infringement upon happiness. Id.
224. See ToRT WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 66. For example, the inherent
subjectivity of noneconomic damage awards may be evidenced by the absence of uniformity in
procedures for determining the amount of damages awarded for pain and suffering. Comparisons
of procedures within a state or between various states show the disparity of awards even where
there are qualitatively and quantitatively comparable injuries. See Werchick, Unmeasurable
Damages and a Yardstick, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 263, 265 (1965).
225. Constitutionalityof California Civil Code, supra note 127, at 54.
226. Jaffe, supra note 100, at 222.
227. TORT WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 66.
228. See O'Connell & Simon, Payment for Pain and Suffering: Who Wants What, When
and Why?, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 4.
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are not economic in nature, allocating economic resources as compensation results in a misallocation of resources.229 This misallocation of
resources may be a luxury that society can ill afford. ° Therefore, a
limitation on noneconomic damages alone is reasonable if the measure
rationally serves the purpose of easing the insurance crisis.21
The absence of a satisfactory quid pro quo to full recovery of tort

damages may signify that legislation limiting liability is arbitrary and

irrational.3 2 The Florida Tort Reform Act purportedly confers a benefit on society by promoting the affordability and availability of liability

insurance.2 Absent insurance, individuals subject to tort actions would
be unprotected, and injured persons would be unable to obtain full
recovery.3 Further, economic growth could be stymied because individuals would be unwilling to assume uninsured risks.9 5 Thus, this

societal benefit of increased insurance availability and affordability is
similar to the reasonably just substitutes upheld in Duke Power,
2 6
Hoffman, Fein, and Johnson.
Additionally, the Florida Supreme
Court, in Chapman and Lasky, found automobile no-fault schemes
constitutional when injured parties were assured recovery for their
major and salient economic losses.m
The Florida Tort Reform Act does not limit economic recovery at
all. In fact, if tort reform stablizes the insurance market by limiting

229. See FLORIDA MEDICAL Ass'N, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE POLICY GUIDEBOOK II,
170-73 (1985) (compensation for pain and suffering viewed as compulsory insurance more expensive than private health and disability insurance and grossly inefficient reallocation of wealth)
[hereinafter FLORIDA MEDICAL AsS'N]; Constitutionality of California Civil Code, supranote
127, at 57.
230. See Peck, Compensationfor Pain: A Reappraisalin Light of New Medical Evidence,
72 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1374 (1974) (Because pain has no definite economic measure, compensation for pain and suffering produces economic distortions. The allocation of economic resources
is efficient only when used for economic purposes. Since pain and suffering are noneconomic, a
net economic loss results when resources are diverted from economic to noneconomic uses);
Constitutionality of California Civil Code, supra note 127, at 56-57.
231. See Note, Fein v. Permanente Medical Group: The Supreme Court Uncaps the Constitutionality of Statutory Limitations on Medical MalpracticeRecoveries, 40 U. MiAhI L. REV.
1075, 1098-99 (1986); Note, The Constitutionality of California Civil Code, supra note 127, at
57-61. But cf. Learner, supra note 126, at 205-06 (statutes limiting medical malpractice unconstitutional because they fail to provide a reasonably just substitute to full recovery in tort).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 192-211.
233. Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 160, § 2.
234. Id.
2,35. See id.
236. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 90-91; Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1437; Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 159,
695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383; Johnson, 273 Ind. at 396, 400, 404 N.E.2d at 599, 601.
237. Chapman, 415 So. 2d at 17; Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 14.
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noneconomic damages, injured parties can be assured full recovery of
economic losses and a substantial part of noneconomic losses. '38 This
societal quid pro quo, therefore, may inure to the benefit of all tort
victims.
The Florida Tort Reform Act contains several mechanisms that
will assess its accomplishments in the future. First, the Act provides
for the sunset of the noneconomic damage limitation in 1990.211 It also
requires the legislature to consider the findings of the Academic Task
Force created by the Act.240 The Academic Task Force will review
the costs and benefits of tort reform.2 41 This statutory assurance of
future review is similar to the congressional promise of future action
to protect the public from nuclear accidents in Duke Power.2 2 The
Duke Power Court found this legislative assurance of future review
significant in upholding a damage limitation. 243
The limitation of noneconomic damages in the Florida Tort Reform
Act should withstand a rational basis review under the due process
clause. Florida's cap on recovery is the most liberal of those recently
passed by other state legislatures. Other states have capped all damages or only noneconomic damages (at a lower amount than Florida's
cap) in medical malpractice actions.m Considering the subjective nature of noneconomic damage awards, a $450,000 cap is probably not
arbitrary or irrational when the limitation can be reasonably presumed
to affect the insurance crisis. Furthermore, the assurance of future
legislative review and availability of insurance to compensate injured
persons for all economic losses and most noneconomic losses is a sufficient quid pro quo to satisfy the due process clause.
B.

Equal Protection

A reasonable benefit conferred upon society may show that a legis-

238. See Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 160 § 2.
239. Id. § 65(1).
240. Id. §§ 63, 65.
241. See id.
242. See 438 U.S. 90-91, 93.
243. Id.
244. Compare FLA. STAT. § 768.80 (Supp. 1986) ($450,000 limit on noneconomic damages)
with CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1979) ($250,000 limit on noneconomic damages); IDAHO
CODE §§ 39-4204 to -4205 (1976) (limit of $150,000 per claim, $300,000 per occurrence); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 101 (1975) (limiting total damages to $500,000); IND. CODE ANN. §
16-9.5-2-2 (West Supp. 1980) (limiting total damages to $500,000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
507-C:7 (1979) (noneconomic damages limited to $250,000); and N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-14-11
(Supp. 1985) (limiting total damages to $500,000).
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lature did not act arbitrarily or irrationally with respect to a due
process review of statutory damage limitations. However, a somewhat
different analysis applies when considering the equal protection
clause.--, The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
states that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. ' "1 While the equal protection clause prevents states from making
improper classifications, 7 the clause does not require that absolute
equality. 8 At a minimum, however, it requires those similarly situated
be treated similarly.249 The equal protection clause is sometimes extended to provide that those not similarly situated will not be similarly
treated.2 O To determine whether a statutory classification affects individuals similarly or differently situated, courts must analyze the objectives of the legislature.2' Additionally, courts must decide if a permissible relationship exists between the classification and the legislative
goals.1-2 To resolve these issues, courts have developed various standards of review to analyze the constitutionality of statutes challenged
on equal protection grounds.
1. The Standards of Review
Traditionally, an equal protection analysis consisted of two standards of review, the strict scrutiny test and the minimum rationality
. - Recently,
test3
the Supreme Court has developed a third test, the
heightened or intermediate standard of review. 25 The strict scrutiny
standard applies to suspect classifications and fundamental rights.2-5

245. The reviews of due process and equal protection claims are similar. See Duke Power
Co., 438 U.S. at 93. The due process clause provides protection for liberty and property interests.
The equal protection clause, however, protects against impermissible discriminatory classifications. Therefore, the review is not identical. See Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859,
866, 555 P.2d 399, 406 (1976).
246. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
247. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980).
248. Id.
249. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
250. L. TRIBE, sup-ra note 115, at 993.
251. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Note, California'sMedical
InjuV Compensation Refonn Act: An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829,
859 (1979).
252. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980).
2,53.See Note, supra note 251, at 859-60.
2,54. Id. at 865.
255. Id. at 860-61.
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Under a strict scrutiny review, the state action must be necessary to
achieve a compelling governmental interest.2 Characteristics of a suspect class include immutable traits over which class members have no
control.25 Additionally, the class must be saddled with disabilities,
subjected to a history of unequal treatment, or relegated to a position
of political powerlessness requiring extraordinary protection from the
political process.2 The United States Supreme Court has limited suspect classes to those discriminated against on the basis of race, alienage, or national origin.- 9 Fundamental rights are those rights
"explicitly or implicitly" guaranteed by the Constitution.2 6 Fundamental rights include voting, travelling, privacy, and first amendment
rights. 261 Laws limiting recovery of damages to classes of seriously
injured victims of tortious conduct do not trigger a strict scrutiny
review.2 2 Such victims transcend the classes of people normally considered suspect. Further, whether the Constitution confers a vested
property right in a particular measure of damages is unclear.26 Therefore, fundamental rights are probably not at stake.
The recently developed intermediate level of review requires that
a classification be substantially related to sufficiently important governmental interests. 26 The Court has applied this standard to classifications involving gender and illegitimacy. 26 In Duke Power, the Supreme Court rejected the intermediate scrutiny test in reviewing the
liability-limiting legislation. Instead, the Court adopted the rational
267
basis test.
Courts have historically employed the rational basis test to review
economic and social welfare legislation.m The rational basis test requires only that the classification bear a rational relation to a legitimate

256. Id. at 860.
257. Id. at 861-62 n. 209.
258. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
259. Note, supra note 251, at 860.
260. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1, 33-34.
261. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (first amendment rights); Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(right to travel); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy).
262. See Note, supra note 251, at 860-63.
263. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88.
264. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3255 (1985).
265. Id.
266. 438 U.S. at 83.
267. Id.

268.

Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss1/4

30

Gavin: The19S6
Constitutionality
of Florida's Cap on Noneconomic Damages in
FLORIDA TORT REFORM ACT

governmental objective.26 9 Under this test, courts generally defer to
legislative determinations.27 Thus, the legislation comes to the court
with a presumption of constitutionality. 1 The burden of proving the
unconstitutionality of the classification thereafter rests with the party
challenging the statute?--2 The Duke Power Court found that a liability
limiting statute was a "classic example" of economic regulation.m
Therefore, according to the Court's present analysis, the rational basis
test will apply to statutes limiting damages in tort actions.
2.

Analysis of Tort Damage Limitations under a Rational Basis Test

The Supreme Court articulated a two-step analysis to determine
whether a particular classification is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental objective.? 4 First, the challenged legislation must have
a legitimate goal.? Second, the legislators must reasonably believe
the classification will promote that goal.?6 Courts recognize that states
should be given wide latitude in the area of economic regulation.M
The classification need not be perfect.? 8 A statute is not unconstitutional simply because the classification created "is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality." 2 9 Furthermore, states may implement their economic programs
one step at a time to ameliorate a perceived evil.20 Thus, under an
equal protection review of social and economic regulation,21 the
judiciary does not sit as a superlegislature to scrutinize unwise policy
decisions made by the legislature.
In applying the rational basis test to damage limitations in medical
malpractice cases, courts have generally found a rational justification
for classifying malpractice victims.2 Statutory measures that cap damages create a class of seriously injured victims who cannot fully recover

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

See New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 83-84.
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id.
Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 668 (1981).

275.
276.

Id.
Id.

277.
278.
279.
280.

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980).
Id.
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).

281.

Id.

282. See Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1437; Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 161-62, 695 P.2d at 682-83, 211
Cal. Rptr. at 385-86; Johnson, 273 Ind. at 400, 404 N.E.2d at 601.
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damages and a class of less seriously injured victims who can recover
full damages.2 The Supreme Court of Indiana, in Johnson, found a
rational correlation between a damage recovery limitation and the
protection of vital societal interests.2 The court determined that the
state legislature acted reasonably in limiting damages to promote
health care. 2
The California limitation on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases has withstood equal protection challenges under a rational basis review. 28 In both Fein and Hoffman, the courts held that
California's cap on noneconomic damages was rationally related to the
legitimate legislative purpose of reducing malpractice insurance
rates.2 7 "[T]he California Legislature had a 'plausible reason' to believe
that the limitations on noneconomic recovery would limit the rise in
malpractice insurance costs."
The legislature reasonably believed
that limiting recovery of noneconomic damages would reduce insurance
premiums 2 to 3.3 percent.2 9 Furthermore, the legislature rationally
assumed that lower malpractice insurance rates would ensure the availability of adequate health care and reduce the possibility of uninsured
doctors.2
Because of judicial deference to legislative judgments and the presumpton of constitutionality attached to economic regulation, the plaintiff challenging a cap on tort damage recovery bears the heavy burden
of showing that the classification is not rationally related to a legitimate
state goal. When legislation is passed to reduce insurance premiums
and subvert a perceived economic crisis, courts may find the objective
legitimate. 291 However, classifications created by the statutory measure must be rationally related to the furtherance of that goal. 2 If a

283. See Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1433; Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 161, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 385; Johnson, 273 Ind. at 397, 404 N.E.2d at 600.
284. 273 Ind. at 400, 404 N.E.2d at 601.
285. Id., 404 N.E.2d at 601.
286. Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1437; Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 161-62, 695 P.2d at 682-83, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 385-86.
287. 767 F.2d at 1437; 38 Cal. 3d at 158-61, 695 P.2d at 680-82, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383-85.
288. Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1437.
289. Id. at 1437 n.9 (projected effect of tort reform measures enacted by California was
20% to 33% reduction in premium rates; 6% to 10% of this amount would result from $250,000
noneconomic damage limitation).
290. Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1437; Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 158-61, 695 P.2d at 680-82, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 383-85.
291. See Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1437; Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 158-61, 695 P.2d at 680-82, 211

Cal. Rptr. at 383-85.
292.

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
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limitation on damages will conceivably reduce insurance rates and
alleviate an insurance crisis, such legislative measures will probably
withstand a rational basis review.2 3 Classifications analyzed under the
rational basis test need not be established with mathematical exactness. " ' Thus, a particular limitation on damages does not create an
impermissible classification of tort victims if a reasonable belief exists
that the classification will affect insurance rates and availability. The
principal question remaining, therefore, is whether a particular dollar
limitation can reasonably be supposed to alleviate the insurance crisis.
3.

The Florida Tort Reform Act's Limitation on Noneconomic
Damages under an Equal Protection Review

Florida's statutory limitation on noneconomic damages discriminates against persons with noneconomic losses exceeding $450,000.
The equal protection clause, however, does not prevent the drawing
of discriminatory lines.2 It only requires that in the area of economic
regulation, where no suspect classes or fundamental rights are involved, classifications must be reasonably related to a legitimate state
interest.2 7 The Florida Legislature established the cap on noneconomic
damages in an effort to ease the insurance affordability and availability
crisis.2'5 The legislature found that a curtailment of insurance would
seriously affect many sectors of Florida's economy. ° Absent insurance, many injured persons would be unable to recover economic and
30
noneconomic losses. 0
The legislature considered evidence of medical malpractice loss
experience to determine that a cap on noneconomic damages would
abate the insurance crisis. 30 1 The evidence showed that only 2.7 percent

293. See Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1437; Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 162, 695 P.2d at 682-83; Johnson,
404 N.E.2d at 601.
294. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980); Lasky, 296 So.
2d at 20.
295. See Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1437; Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 158-61, 695 P.2d at 680-82, 211
Cal. Rptr. at 383-85.
296. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 (1980).
297. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
298. Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws. 160, 2.
299. Id. (preamble).
300. Id.
301. See FLORIDA SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND EcoNwnIIc IMPACT 6TATEMENT 30
(June 9, 1986) (analysis of Tort Reform and Insurance Act cf 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws
160).
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of all medical malpractice claims involved noneconomic compensation
in excess of $100,000.302 In those cases, eighty percent of the total
award was for noneconomic damages.30 3 Pain and suffering awards
greater than $100,000 accounted for an estimated thirty-nine percent
of all medical malpractice damages.3 0 Evidence indicated that in all
tort cases combined, one-third of pain and suffering awards over
$100,000 were recovered in medical malpractice cases.30 5 However,
malpractice cases constituted only 4.5 percent of all personal injury
cases.30 6 Therefore, medical malpractice cases substantially contributed
to the total amount of noneconomic damage awards. The study relied
upon by the legislature utilized indirect nationwide data because reliable figures were not available in Florida. 2 7 Ironically, two major
insurance companies disagreed with the legislature's assessment of
the impact noneconomic damage limitations would have on insurance
3 08
premiums.
After the enactment of Florida's tort reform package, these major
Florida insurance companies indicated that tort reform would have
little or no effect on insurance rates. Specifically, a major general
lines insurance company stated that the $450,000 limitation on noneconomic damages would not affect liability rates. 3 9 A leading medical
malpractice insurer indicated that the noneconomic damage cap would
result in, at best, a 1.1 percent premium reduction. These reports
were based on actual claims analysis rather than the speculative estimates of the study relied upon by the legislature.
The insurance industry evaluations of Florida's noneconomic damage limitation indicate that the legislature may have acted irrationally.
One insurance company noted, however, that the tort law changes
may have an intangible effect on society and may mitigate future
losses.31° The amount of deference courts are willing to grant the
Florida Legislature in assigning arbitrary classifications to liabilitylimiting legislation remains an open question. Arguably, a $450,000
cap on noneconomic recovery bears no rational relation to a reduction

302.

Id. (citing TORT WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 67).

303.

Id.

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id. at 30 (citing FLORIDA MEDICAL ASS'N, supra note 229, at 135a-136).
FLORIDA MEDICAL ASS'N, supra note 229, at 10.
Id.
Id.
Hunter & Angoff, supra note 96; J. Com. & Com., Oct. 21, 1986, at 1A.
J. Com. & Com., Oct. 21, 1986, at 1A.
See id.
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in insurance rates.3 11 However, any estimate of the effect such a limit
will have on insurance premiums is speculative. According to the
United States Supreme Court, if some reasonable basis exists for a
statutory classification, it will withstand rational basis scrutiny.312
Unless a legislature achieves its purpose in a patently arbitrary
or irrational way, the statute will not violate the equal protection
clause. 31 Florida may have acted arbitrarily by limiting noneconomic
damages in all tort cases when evidence relied upon by the legislature
showed that only medical malpractice cases accounted for a substantial
percentage of noneconomic damages.31 4 Nevertheless, an imperfect
classification does not offend the Constitution simply because it is not
made with mathematical exactness or because it results in some inequality.31 r Therefore, since courts generally refuse to sit as a superlegislature when reviewing economic legislation, the Florida Tort Reform Act should withstand an equal protection challenge.
V.

CONCLUSION

The rational basis test applies to economic regulation under the
due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution.316 The Florida Constitution's access to the courts provision re-

quires a similar review.317 Under the rational basis test, Florida's cap
on noneconomic damages should withstand judicial scrutiny if a reasonable likelihood exists that it will further the legitimate governmental
objective of curbing the insurance crisis.318 In making this determination, courts will decide whether the statutory measure is arbitrary or
3
irrational . 19
Although some doubt may exist whether a cap on noneconomic
damages will have any effect on insurance rates, courts generally defer
the wisdom of particular policy determinations to legislative judgment.32' According to recent United States and Florida Supreme Court
cases, the societal benefit of insurance availability to injured persons
and those subject to civil suits is probably a reasonably just substitute

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

See id.
See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980).
Id.
FLORIDA MEDICAL ASS'N, supra note 229, at 10.
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980).
Id.; Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 83-84.
See Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 15.
See id. at 16, 18.

319.

See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 83-84.

320. Id.; Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 15-17.
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for full noneconomic damage recovery.3 21 The subjective nature of

noneconomic damages provides additional justification for a limit on
those damages.32 Furthermore, Florida's $450,000 noneconomic damage cap is considerably higher than California's $250,000 noneconomic
damage limitation in medical malpractice cases.32 3 The California statutory damage cap has withstood constitutional scrutiny. 32 Likewise, the
Florida limitation upon recovery should be constitutional. While any
particular limit on damages may be arbitrary to some degree, neither
mathematical exactitude nor perfect equality is required. A particular limitation will offend the Constitution only if it is patently arbitrary
or irrational.326
The Florida Legislature determined that a serious insurance crisis
exists.3 27 It also found that a limitation on noneconomic damages would,
in conjunction with other tort reform measures, significantly impact
the insurance crisis.32 The legislature also created an Academic Task
Force to study the costs and benefits of tort reform measures.2 Since
the current damage limitation will sunset in 1990,33 specific consider-

ation must be given to the Task Force's findings.w1 Until evidence
shows that a cap on noneconomic damages bears no rational relation
to alleviating the insurance crisis, the Florida Tort Reform Act's liability-limiting measure should pass constitutional muster.
R. Kyle Gavin

321. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88-91, 93; Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 16. But cf. Smith, 12 Fla.
L.W. at 192 (the court did not consider the legislature's finding of an overpowering public
necessity requiring changes in the tort system. Therefore, the court did not reach the issue of
whether the legislature acted rationally in limiting noneconomic damages to increase the availability and affordability of liability insurance thereby assuring injured plaintiffs of full economic
recovery and most noneconomic recovery).
322. See TORT WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 2, at 66.
323. Compare FLA. STAT. § 768.80 (Supp. 1986) with CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1979).
324. Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1437; Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 164, 695 P.2d at 684, 211 Cal. Rptr.
at 387.
325. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980).
326. Id.
327. Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 160 (preamble).
328. Id.
329. Id. § 63.
330. Id. § 65(1).
331. Id. § 65(2).
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